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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
COUNTY OF COLUMBIA 
Petitioner, 
against 
NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION, 
BRIAN FISCHER, Commissioner of New York State 
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, 
NEW YORK BOARD OF PAROLE, ANDREA W. 
EVANS, Chairwoman of the New York Board of Parole, 
Respondents, 
For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice 
Law and Rules. 
Orlee Goldfeld, an attorney admitted to practice before 
, . FUSL00003(:!) 
REPLY AFFIRMATION 
IN FURTHER SUPPORT 
OF VERIFIED PETITION 
APR 1 2 2013 
APR 1 5 2013 
~~~OE.ofNw 
~'Atj'Morr 
York, affirms the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to CPLR 2106: 
1. I am Of Counsel to the firm of Hollyer Brady LLP, counsel for Mr. - I 
make this reply affirmation pursuant to CPLR 7804( d) and (f) and in further support of Mr. 
erified Petition ("Petition"). 
2. The statements herein are true to my knowledge, except as to those matters 
alleged on information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true. 
RESPONDENTS' ACTIONS ARE UNLAWFUL, ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, 
AND IRRATIONAL BORDERING ON IMPROPRIETY 
3. Respondent's Answer1 does not respond substantively to the concerns articulated 
by this Court's April 3, 2013 Decision/Order ("Order"). In essence, Respondents (i) flout the 
demands of the statutory amendments to Executive Law§ 259-c(4), and (ii) assert that, because 
"Answer" refers to Respondents' Verified Answer and the supporting affmnations of Kelly L. Munkwitz 
("Munkwitz Aff.") and Terrence X. Tracy ("Tracy Aff."), all served on April9, 2013. 
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the Parole Board has discretion, that discretion is boundless and it can do whatever it wants. 
More specifically, and despite the Court's observations in its Order, Respondents have not 
proffered any new arguments to meaningfully counter either the likelihood of reoccurrence of 
another non-compliant hearing or the defects in their proceedings in light of the laws that became 
effective in October 2011. 
4. As the Court found, time is of the essence, and Respondents unquestionably 
protracted judicial review of Mr. - claims. Mr. ~as now served nearly 26 months 
for his first and only offense, an E-felony. Under any measure, he should have been released by 
now. 
THE EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE APPLIES 
5. Attempting a second bite at the apple, Respondents again argue the inapplicability 
of the exception to the mootness doctrine, even though this issue is law of the case.2 For the 
reasons set forth in the Petition and the Affirmation in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, 
executed on the 1st day of April 2013 ("Goldfeld Aff. "), which are incorporated by reference as if 
fully set forth herein, the exception to the mootness doctrine applies. 
THE EVANS MEMORANDUM IS NOT§ 259-c(4)'S "PROCEDURES" 
6. The Evans Memorandum says nothing more than "keep doing what you're 
doing." It instructs the commissioners that, even though the Executive Law was amended, 
nothing changed, effectively gutting the Executive Law's requirement of written procedures. 
7. Respondents themselves are inconsistent as to whether the Evans Memorandum is 
or is not the procedures, at one moment proclaiming that it is -- or at least "serving as" -- and the 
next moment dismissing it as mere "explanation." 




8. Respondents' assertion that the Evans Memorandum is sufficient and that they did 
not need to establish procedures in accordance with the State Administrative Procedures Act 
("SAP A") is misguided. 
9. First, Respondents ignore Executive Law§ 259-c(11), which states that the 
"Board of Parole shall ... make rules for the conduct of its work, a copy of such rules and of 
any amendments thereto to be filed by the chairman with the secretary of state." 
10. Second, Respondents intentionally ignore the latter portion of SAP A's definition 
of Rule, which specifically includes procedures: 
"Rule" means (i) the whole or part of each agency statement, regulation or code 
of general applicability that implements or applies law, or prescribes a fee 
charged by or paid to any agency or the procedure or practice requirements of 
any agency, including the amendment, suspension or repeal thereof. .. 
(SAPA § 102(2)(a) (emphasis added)). 
11. Third, assuming, arguendo, that the§ 259-c(4) procedures are to be considered 
mere guidelines or explanations as opposed to rules (Munkwitz Aff. ~~ 26-27), the SAP A 
requires that not less than once a year, each administrative agency shall file with the Secretary of 
State a list of all guidance documents or indicate where its guidance documents are located. 3 
SAPA § 202-e(l)-(2). The Evans Memorandum is nowhere to be found on DOCCS's website, 
and there is no other guideline, guidance document, memorandum, or anything else relating to § 
259-c( 4), notwithstanding the fact that other guidelines relating to some types of parole release 
are listed, e.g. medical parole release, release of special needs inmates, and presumptive release.4 
A guidance document means any guideline, memorandum or similar document prepared by an agency that 
provides general information or guidance to assist regulated parties in complying with any statute, rule or other legal 
requirement, but shall not include documents that concern only the internal management of the agency. 
A copy of a printout ofDOCCS's website (<http://www.doccs.ny.gov/directives.html>, last visited April 
10, 2013) is annexed hereto as Exhibit Y. 
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12. Finally, Respondents offer no explanation for why they admitted in response to a 
FOIL request in April20 12- seven months after Evans Memorandum was written- that they 
were developing the procedures (Goldfeld Aff. Exh. W). 
TAP AND COMPAS ARE REQUIRED 
13. Respondents relieve themselves of the obligation of developing either a TAP or a 
COMPAS for Mr. arguing that neither is required by statute. (Munkwitz Aff. ,, 31-35, 
Tracy Aff., 13). Without these documents, however, it is impossible for Respondents to comply 
with the law and measure an inmate's rehabilitation. 
14. Respondents developed the TAP instrument and rolled it out in three facilities, 
and they administered the COMP AS to Mr his first parole hearing (Petition ~1 28, 
64). Respondents were acting neither voluntarily nor benevolently by doing so. Their enabling 
legislation requires that risk and needs principles be utilized to measure inmate's rehabilitation 
and likelihood of success upon release, see Executive Law § 259-c( 4 ). Correction Law § 71-a 
requires a dynamic case management plan. Correction Law§ 112(4) requires Respondents to 
work together to develop and implement an empirically validated risk and needs assessment 
instrument or instruments. These are the TAP a:nd COMPAS.5 
15. Without such instruments, it is hard to imagine how a board member can 
rationally determine the rehabilitation of a person and likelihood of his success upon release. 
Such a rational determination assessing the unique circumstances of each inmate's parole 
application is exactly what the Legislature has demanded Respondents do. 
16. Moreover, Respondents' argument that they did not have to prepare a TAP or 
COMPAS for anyone that was admitted prior to October 1, 2011 does not comport with 




Respondents' testimony before the Assembly Committee on Correction, their Fact Sheet (see 
Petition~~ 74-76 and referenced exhibits), or the legislative intent of Correction Law§ 71-a: 
Legislative intent. In 1996, the legislature changed the penal law to include as an express 
purpose of imprisonment, the promotion of inmates' successful and productive reentry 
into society. Toward this end, many new responsibilities have been placed on both 
corrections officials and parole officials to ready inmates for their release into the 
community such as: obtaining their birth certificates and social security cards prior to 
release, preparing Medicaid applications as warranted, securing identification cards from 
the department of motor vehicles, and providing them with voter registration forms. In 
addition, transitional services programs have now become mandatory for all inmates. 
Transition accountability plans will be developed for each inmate, starting with 
tlleir time in general confmement and culminating with the inmate's successful 
reintegration into the community. Furthermore, direct linkages with local agencies 
have been greatly enhanced with the creation of Re-entry Task Forces throughout the 
state. 
(Exhibit Z hereto (emphasis added)). 
1 7. If read to not require a TAP for everyone, Correction Law § 71-a would allow 
Respondents to ignore their responsibility to promote the successful and productive reentry into 
society of tens of thousands of parole-eligible inmates incarcerated both prior to and after 
October 1, 2011.6 
CERTIFICATE OF EARNED ELIGIBILITY 
18. Respondents concede that Mr.- receipt of a Certificate of Earned 
Eligibility created a presumptive right of release at the conclusion of his minimum sentence, 
rebuttable only by a lawful and rational finding that there is a reasonable probability that he will 
not live and remain at liberty if released and that his release is not compatible with the welfare of 
society. See Correction Law§ 805. 
19. Respondents could not have made, and in fact did not make, such a determination 
either on the merits or in accordance with the laws, because they had no without written 
See November 14, 2012 parole hearing transcript at 55-56, on file with the Court, in which Respondents 
admit that "TAP is not being utilized." 
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procedures directing how to measure the rehabilitation and likelihood of success upon release for 
a person like Mr. a certificate of earned eligibility. 
20. In this case, Respondents claim to have rebutted Mr.- presumptive right 
by finding that there is a reasonable probability that he will reoffend based solely on the 
"deceitful nature of his actions" over a period of time. Munkwitz Aff. ~ 42. This finding, which 
ignores each and every other factor that militates in favor of parole release, indicates that Mr. 
- parole denial was a foregone conclusion. 
IRRATIONAL BORDERING ON IMPROPRIETY AND UNLAWFUL RESENTENCING 
21. Taken as a whole, Respondents' position is that the 2011 statutory amendments 
meant nothing and required no change to their conduct (Tracy AfT.~~ 11-16). Respondents 
argue that it is within their authority to deny parole, and that they are free to accord whatever 
weight they deem appropriate to any evidence before it, even no weight at all. 
22. The Board's detennination that Mr. is likely to reoffend is not credible, 
has no evidentiary basis in the record, and does not pass the smell test. 
23. Respondents claim that they gave weight to the required statutory factors, 
including Mr.- criminal history (none), his receipt of an EEC (presumptive right to 
release), disciplinary history in prison (spotless), release plans and family support (extensive), 
COMP AS (lowest possible risk rating), restitution (all of the $19 million required), employment 
(job assurance), and his statements that prison has been an "awakening" (remorse). (Munkwitz 
Aff. ~ 65). 
24. As the transcript indicates, however, Respondents gave no weight whatsoever to 
any of these factors and based their decision exclusively on the instant crime. This was a thinly 
veiled resentencing meant to punish Mr. - for his past actions, not for what he might do on 
6 
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parole, and goes beyond the limited administrative powers confirmed upon the Respondents to 
make a rational determination of a reasonable probability of reoffending if at liberty. 7 
ANOTHER UNLAWFUL HEARING WILL ONLY CAUSE 
CONTINUED IRRP ARABLE HARM 
25. As this Court noted, time is of the essence. There is no evidence to suggest that 
Respondents will apply the Executive Law in the manner in which it was intended without 
judicial intervention. 
26. Given that Respondents have failed to rebut Mr. ~resumptive right to 
release since his first unlawful hearing in February 2012, and offered no new arguments to 
support their position in their Answer, Mr. - should be granted a writ of habeas corpus or 
any other remedy deemed appropriate of commensurate effect. 
27. In the event that the Court determines that a de novo hearing is an adequate 
remedy, Mr.~hould be released to parole supervision until the time that Respondents are 
willing and capable of conducting such hearing in compliance with the law. Mr.- should 
not be made to suffer further irreparable injury due to Respondents ' willful recalcitrance. 
28. Mr. - respectfully requests that the Court maintain jurisdiction over his 
claims. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in the Petition, the Goldfeld Aff., and herein, Mr. -
respectfully requests that the Court enter Judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR for the 
See, e.g., Matter of King v. NYS Division a/Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 598 N.Y.S.2d 245 (lst Dept., 1993), 
a./f'd 83 N.Y.2d 788, 610 N.Y.S.2d 954, 632 N.E.2d 1277 (1994); Matter ofRios v. NYS Division a/Parole, 15 
Misc.3d ll07(A), 2007 WL 846561 (Sup.Ct., Kings Co., 2007); Matter ofThwaites v. New York State Board 
of Parole, 34 Misc.3d 694 (Sup. Ct., Orange Co. 2011). Respondents' reliance upon scores of decisions involving 
inmates sentenced for heinous, violent crimes is misplaced. 
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relief requested in the Petition, and grant such other and further relief as may be deemed just and 
proper, including attorneys' fees and costs. 
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